in June !986, while budget deliberations were in full swing, ~he General Accounting Office published a report which questioned the Navy's justification for the strategic homeporting program.
Additionally, the report stated that the Navy had seriously ~Jnderestimated the cost of the program, and concluded that it was possible both to accommodate 600 ships in existing homeports and to do so less expensively than with new homeports. Representative Bates of California, for instance, stated that before approval of the plan, the Navy should be required to pledge that strategic homeporting would not diminish fleet levels in existing homeports. ~ The Navy obviously successfully assuaged these concerns.
It is an interesting footnote to the bureaucratic politics of strategic homeporting that the program outlived the 600 ship Navy it was intended to support. The fleet actually peaked at 570 ships in 1987, and under increasing budgetary pressure and the decline of the Soviet threat, the 1995 projection is a fleet composed of about 450 ships with only 12 carriers. Nevertheless, $640 million have been obligated to date for strategic homeports, and work continues toward completion of five of the original nine homeports. ~ It is safe to assume that it is only the political sunk costs of Congress that have kept strategic homeporting afloat.
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